B.2(u). Right to a Speedy Trial

The accused and the public both have the Right to a speedy trial. If there are delays, they must help the accused unless the court finds that the accused acted in bad faith. A trial is considered speedy if it starts within twenty-four (24) months of arraignment. In complicated cases, more time may be given, but only if counsel explains to the judge, with clear proof, why it’s needed. Discovery and pre-trial should never take more than three (3) years for any reason.

It is well known that a person in the United States enjoys the right to a speedy trial.[1] It is far less well understood exactly what that means. In fact, no fixed standard exists. In precedent, there is a balancing standard established under Barker v. Wingo (1972),[2] but it is problematic. While the court correctly pointed out that it is not the court's role to create a rigid rule,[3] the idea that a balancing test is somehow less activist is absurd on its face. And the test proposed by the court is vague:

1. How long was the delay?

2. What was the reason for the delay?

3. Did the defendant demand a speedy trial? How vigorously?

4. How did the delay harm the defendant?

The only one of those four pillars that is objective is the first one. The reason for the delay pillar, for example, assumes that there is somehow less harm in a delay granted for one reason than in another. Did the defendant demand a speedy trial? Who cares? A right that has to be invoked isn’t a right; it is a granted petition. How vigorously? How do you measure that?

The point here is clear. There is no objectivity, no blind justice, to this test.

It is important to remember that the right to a speedy trial is as vital to the public as to the defendant. Justice delayed is justice denied. The record shows that the government, when it really wants to do so, can try even complex cases quickly. Timothy McVeigh’s trial began two years and seven days after his arrest.

This clause establishes the principle that this right applies to the general public, as well as to the defendant. That said, the defendant’s rights take precedence. The clause also lays out a basic expectation of two years to begin trial, with continuance allowed up to the three-year mark, which becomes a hard limit.

Strategic delay to lose access to witnesses or other deliberate means to game the system are shut down.

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[1] U.S. Const. amend. VI.

[2] Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

[3] Id. at 523. “We do not establish procedural rules for the states, except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.”