B.2(z). Freedom of Belief

Every single person has beliefs. Everyone. In Intro to Philosophy in 1986, I was taught that a belief is defined as a thought that the holder holds strongly enough to act upon. That is, belief is not just “circles are a geometric shape where every point along the perimeter is the same distance from the center as every other point,” but living and acting to make sure that when you draw or refer to circles, that’s the definition you use.

But in civic life, beliefs also belong to the marketplace of ideas. The marketplace of ideas is a vital concept. In any democracy, whether it's ancient Athens or a modern republic like ours, that marketplace has to be healthy and free. For that marketplace to thrive, people have to be free to hold whatever beliefs they need to keep. And they need to be able to act on those beliefs.

But can a marketplace of ideas without any limits at all function? Not for long, no. Suppose people are free to act on their beliefs. What stops the person who legitimately believes all people of a certain class must die, what besides their financial and physical limitations prevents them from doing so? Or in the case of a person who sincerely believes that contraception is wrong, but they are a pharmacist, so they refuse to refill birth control prescriptions? What about a church that refuses to hire a qualified candidate as its secretary because the candidate is an atheist?

A reasonable person has to concede that there have to be limits, but what limits? How do we prevent those limits from being a type of tyranny of their own?

There is only one morally defensible line that can be drawn. When action on a belief infringes the rights of others, it must be restricted. But, even then, the restriction can’t be wholesale. Could the person act within their beliefs in some other way that would avoid infringing on another’s rights? If so, then only the specific behavior in question can be restrained.

The bigot in my first example can hold or speak on their belief that certain people should die, but they can’t simply take action on that belief. That example is obvious.

The church that refuses to hire a qualified candidate is a different example entirely. The fact is, however, that the candidate is likely not being denied employment everywhere for their beliefs. It is only in a specific, faith-based context where the competing belief systems are at odds. This is probably still defensible.

The trickiest of my three examples is the pharmacist. In an urban setting, there may be no problem; simply find another pharmacist, possibly even at the same pharmacy. But what about rural Wyoming, where the next closest pharmacy is hours away? In that case, it might be unreasonable for that pharmacist to withhold the medication. The beliefs, or even their expression, are acceptable, but when actions are taken that infringe the rights of others, those actions must be restricted.

Another key element in the marketplace of ideas is persuasion and persuadability. That is, a person has the agency to decide their previous beliefs were wrong and to adopt new ones in their place, or to simply stop believing anything on a given subject. If that freedom isn’t maintained, deliberative democracy is impossible.